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tutional. While the Fourth Circuit may attempt to limit the impact
of Hart as precedent, its holding will not be easily limited to the facts.
The court noted: "We think that a sentence of life imprisonment, the
most severe punishment available under West Virginia law, is unnecessary to accomplish the legislative purpose to protect society from
an individual who has committed three wholly nonviolent crimes over
a period of twenty years."74 In light of the court's decision in Hart, it
would seem advisable for every defendant incarcerated under the
West Virginia recidivist statute to consider challenging his life sentence if it is based upon convictions for nonviolent crimes.
It is suggested that in response to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Hart the West Virginia legislature should act to prevent constitutionally suspect application of its recidivist statute. This could be accomplished by revising the statute to provide for either judicial evaluation of the underlying offenses prior to imposition of the life sentence
or a less severe mandatory sentence. Until the statute is revised,
West Virginia trial courts will be faced with the dilemma of either
following legislative intent and applying the mandatory sentence required by the statute, or following the apparent dictates of the Hart
decision and considering whether the mandatory sentence would be
excessive and disproportionate in light of the offenses underlying the
recidivist statute's application.
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH HABENICHT

THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR GUILTY PLEAS AND
THE RESTRICTIVE SCOPE OF DIRECT
CONSEQUENCES
Unless a waiver of constitutional rights is made voluntarily and
intelligently,' the waiver will be deemed to violate due process.2 Ac3
cordingly, since a defendant who pleads guilty in a criminal case

"Id.at 141. In the same vein the court noted, "Life imprisonment is the penultimate punishment. Tradition, custom, and common sense reserve it for those violent
persons who are dangerous to others." Id.
'Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady the Supreme Court stated:
"Waiver of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Id. at 748.
!Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969).
'Although the scope of the voluntary and intelligent standard for guilty pleas
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4
simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, a guilty plea
cannot be accepted as valid by a court unless the court has first
5
determined that the defendant pleaded voluntarily and intelligently.
Unfortunately, what constitutes a "voluntary and intelligent" waiver
of the constitutionally guaranteed due process safeguards6 has not
been clearly delineated by the courts. 7 In its recent decision, Cuthrell
v. Director,Patuxent Institution,8 the Fourth Circuit was primarily
concerned with the proper scope of this due process requirement.
More particularly, the court was faced with the determination of the
extent to which a defendant must be apprised of the potential consequences of a conviction in order for the "voluntary and intelligent"
requirement to be satisfied.
The requisite amount of knowledge which a defendant must possess in entering a guilty plea has not been precisely determined. The
Supreme Court stated in Kercheval v. United States' that a guilty

applies to all criminal cases, the focus of this comment is on felony cases as these are
the cases which are usually the subject of additional consequences.
'In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme Court included the
following as constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea: privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, right to confront one's accusers. Id. at 243 n.5.
'In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme Court held that "[ilt
was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty
plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Id. at 242.
'See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
-The Supreme Court itself has used a different standard for determining the admissibility of a confession into evidence than it has for determining the validity of a
guilty plea. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court held that a
confession was admissible only if made freely and voluntarily and not "extracted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight." Id. at 542-43. Were this standard also applied to guilty pleas, all guilty pleas
resulting from the widely-used practice of plea bargaining would be held invalid, for
they are undoubtedly obtained by direct or implied promises. Instead, the Court has
used a standard that is focused primarily on the rationality and intelligence of a guilty
plea. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which the Court recognized
this focus: "For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious . . . " Id. at 752. In
order for a guilty plea to be voluntarily made, then, it must be a rational decision in
view of all the relevant circumstances surrounding it. Id. at 748.
'475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973).
1274 U.S. 220 (1927). Kercheval is generally recognized as the authority for the
notion that comprehension of the consequences of a guilty plea is a requirement of
constitutional due process. It should be noted that this decision antedates widespread
recognition that due process requirements extend to and limit the states. These requirements were placed upon the states in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969),
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plea should not be accepted unless the defendant had a "full understanding of the consequences."'' 0 In light of the Court's failure to
particularize the meaning and scope of the term "consequences," the
lower federal courts have interpreted the ambit of that term in a
restrictive manner, requiring that a defendant only be informed of the
"direct consequences"" of his guilty plea. The term "direct consequences," even in its broadest sense, describes solely those consequences of which a defendant must be aware if his guilty plea to a
particular charge is to be accepted as valid. Thus, federal courts have
not considered it necessary to inform the defendant of possible or
"collateral" consequences.' 2
Collateral consequences are those which do not relate directly to
the charge to which the defendant pleads guilty.' 3 There is no uniform
test by which the circuits distinguish direct consequences from those
that are deemed collateral; however, the test used by the Fourth
Circuit in Cuthrell is one which has been adopted by the majority of
the circuits.'4 This test turns on "whether the result represents a
definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of defendant's punishment."' 5 At present, all the circuits consider the folwhich fastened upon the states the rigid requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 395 U.S. 238, 245 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"'Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
"In Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 847
(1968), the court stated that in determining whether the defendant understood the
consequences of his plea, the determination was limited to the direct consequences.
Id. at 159.
'Id. at n.10. See also United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (not
necessary to inform a defendant of collateral consequences).
Collateral consequences include inter alia: deportation (United States v. Parrino,
212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954)); recidivist statutes (United
States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963)); defective delinquent acts (Tippett v.
Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971)); sexual deviates acts (Butler v. Burke, 360
F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1966)); loss of an occupational license (State v. Payne, 24 Wis. 2d
603, 129 N.W.2d 250 (1964)); loss of the right to vote (Meaton v. United States, 328
F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964)); loss of good time credit (Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d
930 (10th Cir. 1971)); loss of right to hold public office (United States v. Cariola, 323
F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963)); undesirable discharge from the armed services (Redwine v.
Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963)); and loss of passport (Meaton v. United States,
328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964)).
'Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 159 n.10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.

844 (1968).
"However, the test used by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1970), measured the severity of the consequence and the likelihood of its being included in the judgment of whether or not to
plead guilty.
1:475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973).
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lowing as within the purview of direct consequences: the maximum
sentence which is possible and the minimum sentence which is mandatory, 6 concurrent and consecutive sentence possibilities, 7 and the
existence of special sentencing possibilities which would have an effect on defendant's penalty. 8 Additionally, all but two circuits include parole ineligibility within the category of direct consequences. 9
Although the sheer speculativeness of most collateral consequences militates against requiring courts to include them within the
scope of direct consequences, there are some of sufficient severity to
merit inclusion. Whether "automatic""0 or not, consequences which
"Jones v. United States, 440 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1971); Tucker v. United States, 409
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Tibbs v. United States, 459 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1972).
"Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963). See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-

INC,TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, APPROVED DRAFT § 1.4 (1968), which suggests:
The Court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally
and
(a) determining that he understands the nature of the
charge;
(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty or nolo contendere he waives his right to trial by jury; and
(i) of the maximum possible sentence on the

charge, including that possible from consecutive
sentences;
(ii) of the mandatory minimum sentence if any, on
the charge, and

(iii) when the offense charged is one for which a
different or additionalpunishment is authorized by
reason of the fact that the defendant has previously
been convicted of any offense, that this fact may be
established after his plea in the present action if he
has been previously convicted, thereby subjecting
him to such different or additional punishment (emphasis added).
9

' The following cases hold that parole ineligibility is included within direct consequences:
Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1972); Paige v. United
States, 443 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d
521 (7th Cir. 1971); Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1970);
Harris v. United States, 426 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United
States, 420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d
189 (3d Cir. 1969); Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir.
1969); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964).
The Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit do not include parole ineligibility as a direct consequence. United States v. Farias, 459 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 1972).
2
'See note 15 supra.
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impose grave penalties and which are likely to be applied are necessary considerations in the formulation of an intelligent and rational
trial strategy. There are two consequences which demonstrate this
dual criterion of severity of the consequence coupled with probability
of its application: indeterminate sentencing under defective delinquent acts and deportation. While there is some speculativeness as
to the applicability of these consequences to a particular defendant,
their exclusion from the direct consequences category has caused
seemingly inequitable results."
In Cuthrell, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that indeterminate sentencing to Patuxent Institution,2 2 a therapeutic institution
for defective delinquents,? was not a direct consequence of a guilty
2See Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1972) (indeterminate commitment); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 840 (1954) (deportation).
2
Patuxent Institution was established to house and care for individuals who, by
the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evidence a
propensity toward criminal activity, and who are found to have either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance as to demonstrate an actual danger to society.
Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971).
The Patuxent Institution was created in response to the failings of the penal
system of Maryland. It is a facility which combines both therapeutic treatment with
incarceration. Although the orientation of Patuxent is meant to be that of a therapeutic institution rather than a prison, nonetheless Patuxent has many semblances to a
prison atmosphere. Physically it is a complex of buildings inside a tall fence topped
with barbed wire and a tower manned by armed guards. As in Cuthrell, an offender
who has been convicted and regularly sentenced for a crime that falls within several
broad categories is recommended for a defective delinquent hearing. Upon conviction
at the hearing, he is committed to Patuxent for an indeterminate period without either
maximum or minimum limits. See Address by Brian Crowley, M.D., Potomac Foundation for Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland, Maryland's Defective Delinquent
Law-Nightmarish Prelude to 1984. See also Boslow & Kohlmeyer, The Maryland
Defective Delinquent Law-An Eight Year Followup, 120 AM. J. PSYCH. 2 (1963); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6 (1967).
MD.ANN. CODE art. 31B § 5 (1971 Repl. vol.) provides in part:
For the purposes of this article, a defective delinquent shall be defined
as an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated
antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity ...
It is further provided that "a criminal defendant may not be referred to Patuxent
Institution for examination unless he has been convicted and sentenced for a crime or
offense committed on or after June 1, 1954, coming under one or more of the following
categories: (1) a felony; (2) a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary; (3) a crime of violence; (4) a sex crime involving: (A) physical force or
violence; (B) disparity of age between an adult and a minor, or (C) a sexual act of
uncontrolled and/or repetitive nature; or (5) two or more convictions for any offenses
or crimes punishable by imprisonment, in a criminal court of this State." Id. at § 6.
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plea. The petitioner, Cuthrell, had been convicted on a plea of guilty
to an assault charge by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. After
being sentenced to five years imprisonment, he was ordered by the
presiding judge to Patuxent to undergo an evaluation to determine
whether he was a defective delinquent and therefore subject to the
Maryland Defective Delinquent Act.24 Following an evaluation, it was
recommended that Cuthrell be confined at Patuxent, and after a civil
hearing he was committed there for an indeterminate period. Thetranscript of the trial at which the defendant pleaded guilty revealed
that at no time did the court or his court-appointed lawyer advise
Cuthrell of the possibility that he might be committed to Patuxent.
Cuthrell collaterally attacked his conviction, alleging that his ignorance of eligibility for indeterminate sentencing to Patuxent rendered his guilty plea involuntary and therefore constitutionally invalid. The trial court upheld the conviction, and the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed on the basis that commitment to Patuxent was not
a direct consequence of which the defendant should have been informed before entering his plea. Cuthrell then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Maryland District Court. The petition
was denied and appeal was subsequently taken to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Cuthrell's appeal on two grounds. First,
the court concluded that the petitioner's commitment to Patuxent
did not automatically or immediately result from his plea., Second,
the court held that commitment to Patuxent did not constitute punishment2
Weaknesses exist in each of the court's conclusions. In applying
the "automaticness" test, the court reasoned that Cuthrell's conviction merely placed him in a class subject to evaluation by trained
experts whose judgment could be contested in a civil proceeding.2
Since commitment depended on an intervening occurrence-a subsequent, independent civil trial-the court held that Cuthrell's confinement was not an automatic result of his guilty plea. Yet empirical
evidence indicates that a high percentage of defendants convicted
and recommended for evaluation at Patuxent are ultimately committed indeterminately: two-thirds of all those evaluated are recommended for commitment to the institution,2 and only one-fifth of
v1 d.
475 F.2d at 1366.
2Id. at 1367.
2
1See Director, Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 43, 221 A.2d 397, 413
(1966), which discusses in detail the procedures used under the Maryland Defective
Delinquent Act. See also Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969).
zReferral to Patuxent for examination, findings and report does not automatically
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those recommended prevail at a subsequent civil trial. 9 Fifty-four per
cent of those initially evaluated are committed to Patuxent for an
indeterminate period.
The second basis for the court's opinion in Cuthrell, distinguishing between punishment and treatment, was based on reasoning
which was strongly criticized by the Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Indiana." In Jackson, the Court stated that there "are substantial
doubts about whether the rationale . . . that care or treatment will
aid the accused . . . is empirically valid given the state of most of
our mental institutions. '3 Whether or not confinement at Patuxent
may fairly be characterized as treatment, it does constitute both
substantial deprivation of freedom and subjection to conditions not
dissimilar to those which prevail in prison.32 In another Supreme
Court case, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,3 Mr. Justice
Douglas commented that a person is deprived of his liberty whenever
he is held against his will regardless of the name of the institution or
its purpose.3 4 Moreover, the director of Patuxent conceded in 1963
that Patuxent served a confinement as well as a treatment purpose.
This confinement function may result in a life sentence behind bars
for the defective delinquent, as was noted by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Murel v. Baltimore City CriminalCourt:35 "Should a defective delinquent not receive treatment, or should treatment prove inadequate
to return him to society, the inmate might well remain in Patuxent
for the remainder of his life." 6 Thus, if the committed patients do
not convince the Patuxent authorities that they have responded favorably to therapeutic treatment and no longer pose a danger to
society, they remain incarcerated, 3 often for a period longer than that
result in a staff finding of defective delinquency. "Over twenty-five per cent of those
examined are reported as not being defective delinquents." Sas v. Maryland, 295 F.
Supp. 389, 416 (D. Md. 1969).
7425 F.2d at 1367.
--406 U.S. 715 (1972).
"Id. at 735.
"See note 22 supra. See Boslow & Kohlmeyer, The Maryland Defective Delinquent Act-An Eight Year Followup, 120 AM. J. PSYCH. 2 (1963). See Washington Post,
November 10, 1973, § B at 1, col. 8.
"407 U.S. 245 (1972).
3Id. at 257.
-5407 U.S. 355 (1972).
,"Id.at 357, 358 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"7This possibility was viewed as a positive factor by the Maryland District Court
in Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969):
[W]hile from an administrative standpoint an argument can be
made that extended terms for the protection of the public should be
sentences to the prison system . . . the great weight of professional

1974]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

of their original criminal sentence. A recent statistical analysis determined that 151 of the 348 inmates then committed remained at Patuxent for a period longer than their original sentences.3 8 Some inmates have been found incurable, which means that they never will
be released from Patuxent.3 9 Although the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act is based upon modern views and methods of rehabilitation
rather than punishment, 0 the resulting confinement is a grave consequence and therefore exclusion of the Act from the direct consequence
category should not be justified simply by noting its treatment function.
Not only does this second basis for the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Cuthrell seem unreasonable, but it also appears to conflict with its
earlier decision in Pilkington v. United States.4 In Pilkington, the
district court failed to advise the criminal defendant, who had
pleaded guilty to a charge of theft,12 that he was subject to the Federal
Youth Corrections Act (FYCA)4 3 under which he could be sentenced
testimony placed it [the indeterminate sentence] as a "plus" factor;
it is "an incentive because it does place in large neon bright letters
the fact that you have to work on this thing or you are going to be here
for a very long period of time. In Patuxent it becomes very clear to
the patients that they have to really convince the staff that they have
changed, it is not enough to behave oneself."
Id. at 417-18.
3
8Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarcerationof Dangerous Criminals:
Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. Rav. 602, 606 (1970).
"Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389, 416 (D. Md. 1969) stated: "All committed
inmates are 'treatable,' but not necessarily curable."
"See note 22 supra.
"315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963).
'2Pilkington was charged with stealing from a United States Naval Bank under 18
U.S.C. § 661 (1970) which provides:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, takes and carries away, with intent to steal or
purloin, any personal property of another shall be punished as follows:
If the property taken is of a value exceeding $100, or is taken from
the person of another, by a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both; in all other cases, by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment not more than one year,
or both.
If the property stolen consists of any evidence of debt, or other
written instrument, the amount of money due thereon, or secured to
be paid thereby and remaining unsatisfied, or which in any contingency might be collected thereon, or the value of the property the title
to which is shown thereby, or the sum which might be recovered in
the absence there of, shall be the value of the property stolen.
1318 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970), which provides in part:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not

244

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

to a potential maximum confinement of six years. Instead, the court
informed him that the maximum sentence possible was five years.
After Pilkington pleaded guilty, the court determined to sentence
him under the FYCA rather than under the theft statute. In the
opinion reversing the district court, Judge Sobeloff used reasoning
seemingly appropriate for Cuthrell:
[T]he point made is that the defendant was permitted to
plead guilty under a misapprehension as to the penalties to
which the plea subjected him. Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., requires the judge to leave no room for such misapprehension.
However looked at, the deprivation of liberty for a possible
need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence and place the youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth
offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than this subsection, the court may, in
lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for
treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged
by the Division as provided in Section 5017 (c) of this chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able
to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to
the expiration of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu
of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence
the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period
that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which he
stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as provided in
section 5017 (d)of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive
benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may
sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
It is further provided in part under 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1970):
(c) A youth offender committed under section 5010 (b) of this
chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before
the expiration of four years from the date of his conviction and shall
be discharged unconditionally on or before six years from the date of
his conviction.
(d) A youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this
chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision not later
than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court.
He may be discharged unconditionally at the-expiration of not less
than one year from the date of his conditional release. He shall be
discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of
conviction.
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period of six years is a greater penalty than a sentence for a
lesser period. Applying the euphemism "treatment" to the discipline during confinement does not alter the arithmetic, and
is immaterial for present purposes.4
The court then urged district judges to explain the sentencing possibilities of the Act before accepting guilty pleas from youthful defendants. 5' While recognizing the inconvenience that the practice might
entail, Judge Sobeloff nonetheless concluded that the defendant who
pleads in ignorance of those sentencing possibilities does not plead
voluntarily and should be permitted to withdraw his plea. In other
words, the court concluded that the defendant lacked the requisite
knowledge to enter an intelligent plea.
No logical basis seems to exist for the Fourth Circuit's inconsistent results in Pilkington and Cuthrell. Although in Pilkington the
court emphasized that sentencing under the FYCA flows directly
from the criminal trial, the statute is dependent upon the trial judge's
discretion,4 6 and therefore is not "automatic." While commitment to
Patuxent is not automatic, it follows as a practical matter in a majority of cases in which the defendant is referred to Patuxent for evaluation." Furthermore, the consequences in Cuthrell, though perhaps
less automatic, were considerably more severe than those in
Pilkington. The effect of the judge's failure to inform the defendant
in Pilkington of the FYCA was the possibility of an additional year
of confinement; in Cuthrell, the effect could conceivably amount to
confinement for a lifetime. Finally, while the Fourth Circuit in
Pilkington swept aside the distinction between punishment and
treatment, it supported its holding in Cuthrell on this distinction. A
defendant should have knowledge of the grave consequences which
are likely to result from his plea if he is to make a rational decision
as to whether or not to plead guilty. In Pilkington, the Fourth Circuit
responded to this need, but in Cuthrell they buried this consideration
beneath the rationales of "automaticness" and treatment.
The injustice of considering indeterminate commitment under a
defective delinquent act as merely a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea can be analogized to the injustice of deeming another consequence of conviction, deportation, a collateral consequence. Deportation is another severe consequence of conviction which most courts
"315 F.2d at 208.
"Id.
"118 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1970) contains the discretionary language, "If the court is
of the opinion .... " See note 43 supra.
'See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.

246

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

have excluded from the requisite knowledge a defendant must have
when pleading. Yet, Mr. Justice Brandeis has equated deportation to
"[the] loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living."' 8 A case which demonstrates both the present position of the
majority of the circuit courts and the inherent injustice of this position is United States v. Parrino.9 There, the defendant was deported,
as a result of his plea of guilty to a criminal charge of income tax
evasion. Parrino had consulted a lawyer who advised him that he
would not be subject to deportation. On this advice Parrino pleaded
guilty. " After deportation proceedings were instituted, Parrino petitioned to withdraw his plea under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure." This motion was denied even though a supporting affidavit by his lawyer was submitted. The Second Circuit, affirming the denial, asserted that Parrino's claim was not based upon
"the severity of the sentence directly flowing from the judgment but
a collateral consequence thereof, namely, deportability." 5 Judge
Frank wrote a vigorous dissent:
Judicial sensibilities ought not to be markedly different from
those of the layman. I think, if he understood this case, it
would severely shock the sense of justice-or injustice-of the
ordinary citizen to learn that this court
(a) denies this defendant the chance he asks to go to trial so
that he may prove, if he can, his innocence, and
(b) permits him to be deported because of his lawyer's astonishing ignorance. I believe that such a shock plainly manifests
injustice.53
11Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). See Jordan v. De George, 341
U.S. 223 (1951), where the Supreme Court, in a case challenging the validity of a
deportation order, commented: "The Court has stated that 'deportation is a drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile ....
It is the forfeiture
for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.'" Id. at

231.
"212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
'It is doubtful whether an argument as to effectiveness of counsel could have
changed the result. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
"FED. R. CRINt. P. 32(d) provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is
suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence
may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant
to withdraw his plea.
"212 F.2d at 921.
*"Id. at 922, 926-27 (Frank, J., dissenting). 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 32.07
[361 at 32-106 (Cipes ed. 1969) predicts that Judge Frank's dissent likely reflects the
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While the majority of the circuits still adhere to the position that
deportation is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, the trend is
now toward a change in this approach. In United States v. Briscoe,54
the District of Columbia Circuit stated that Judge Frank's dissent
more likely reflects the present attitude of the federal judiciary and
"[c]alculations of the likelihood of deportation may thus rightly be
included in the judgment as to whether an accused should plead
guilty . .
" Although dictum, this statement nonetheless reflects
the importance with which some federal courts view a defendant's
awareness of severe though not automatic consequences of his guilty
plea in determining its voluntariness.
The Supreme Court has stated that the acceptance of guilty pleas
"demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." 6 Courts
have not responded to this suggestion and have instead limited the
scope of direct consequences. Underlying the limitations thus imposed are basic policy determinations rooted in administrative needs
that dictate narrow interpretation of the direct consequence category.
57
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Cariola,
forcefully explained
why these policy decisions cause appellate judges to refrain from
requiring their trial brethren to advise the defendant of collateral
consequences:
To hold that no valid sentence of conviction can be entered
under a plea of guilty unless the defendant is first apprised of
all collateral legal consequences of the conviction would result
in a mass exodus from the federal penitentiaries ...
Any such requirement would impose upon the judge an
impractical burden out of all proportion to the essentials of fair
and just administration of the criminal laws."
In spite of the court's language in Cariola, it is doubtful whether the
result of requiring that a defendant be advised of important collateral
consequences would be to free convicted prisoners. It should be noted
that the failure of a trial judge to apprise defendants of requisite
consequences does not immunize defendants from further prosecucoming attitude of the Federal judiciary. See United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351,
1353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
5'432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
5MId. at 1354.
"'Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
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tion, but only requires that their pleas be vacated 8 and allows them
a trial on the merits. Furthermore, any decision requiring defendants
to be advised of important consequences could be applied prospectively only. In Linkletter v. Walker, 9 the Supreme Court, in deciding not to apply the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio" retroactively, announced its criterion for retroactive application: "[I]n each
of the three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively
the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial-the
very integrity of the fact-finding process."'" Under this criterion there
would be no justification for a retrospective application of a decision
that incorporated previously-excluded consequences within the category of information that the defendant must have in order to make
an intelligent guilty plea. Therefore, to expand the ambit of direct
consequences would not cause a "mass exodus" from the prisons.
Although expanding the scope of direct consequences to include
severe collateral consequences would increase the burden of the trial
judge, knowledge of such consequences may be vital to a rational
waiver of trial. Courts are rightly concerned with administrative
economy, but such a concern should not be paramount in their decisions. It is far more important that they justly apply the strictures of
criminal procedure.
The criminal justice system is based upon a traditional commitment to the trial process, with all of the protections it affords the
defendant.62 However, the system has come increasingly to depend
upon guilty pleas, which are largely the product of plea bargains. 3 In
order for a defendant to assess the bargain properly, he should have
knowledge of the ramifications of each alternative, especially the
consequences which are of such gravity that they would likely affect
his decision. There should be a reassessment of the present position
of the law, and a framework developed that will enable a defendant
to exercise more informed judgment when deciding whether to plead
guilty.
One possibility would be to create a uniform test, which would
measure the severity of the consequence together with the likelihood
of its imposition. However, in many instances there would be substantial difficulties in requiring a judge to anticipate the likelihood
and assess the severity of a consequence; both of which are often
"Id. at 186.
51Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
"'381 U.S. 618 (1965).
61367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'2381 U.S. at 639 (footnote omitted).
63See note 4 supra.
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highly subjective determinations. Perhaps a more workable system,
but one that still would afford defendants adequate knowledge, would
be to include the severest of consequences, notably indeterminate
sentencing and deportation, in the definition of direct consequences.
Such inclusion would put the defendant on notice that conviction
might result in consequences more severe than a prison term or fine.
It should be noted that the above practice parallels the current procedures, where the judge informs the defendant of the maximum sentence possible and the minimum sentence which is mandatory, but
does not inform the defendant of the precise sentence which he will
impose after the defendant's conviction. Furthermore, once a defendant has the knowledge necessary to form an intelligent decision, he
"assumes the risk of ordinary error in his assessment of the law and
facts of his case" upon which he bases his choice. 4 By incorporating
severe consequences, whether "automatic" or not, into the due process requirement of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the federal
courts could effectively lessen the growing number of petitions for
writs of habeas corpus since a number of such petitions are claims of
involuntary guilty pleas. 5 At the same time the vital interests of the
defendant would be safeguarded.
In view of the anomalous results inherent in the current approach
of the division of consequences66 and the frequency of plea disposition
of criminal cases, the circuits should respond to the need for further
improvements. At present there are varied and slow responses to the
need for expansion of direct consequences. One such response is the
trend toward including deportation noted by the District of Columbia
"See Judge Bazelon's dissent in United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir.
1971), in which he states:
Our criminal justice system has come increasingly to depend on
guilty pleas, which are largely the product of plea bargains. It is said
that the system would break down if every defendant demanded his
constitutional right to a trial. To avoid that breakdown, we tolerate a
system which substitutes low-visibility negotiations for the adversary
process. So long as we depend on a system that encourages defendants
to waive their constitutional rights, we have an obligation at least to
ensure that defendants do not waive their rights through ignorance,
without full understanding of the consequences. Surely poor, uneducated, or inexperienced people are entitled to at least [this] much
protection in negotiating pleas to criminal charges, when liberty is at
stake.

.. "

454 F.2d 918, 924 at 925 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
GlUnited States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 405 (9th Cir. 1972).

"See

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 139 (1967).

"See note 21 supra.
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Circuit in United States v. Briscoe." Additionally, the courts have
shifted noticeably in their views concerning parole ineligibility. Until
recently, parole ineligibility was considered a collateral consequence:
"[N]oneligibility for parole is not a 'consequence' of a plea of guilty
. . . rather, it is a consequence of the withholding of legislative
grace." 9 Presently, all but the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit" include parole ineligibility as a direct consequence of
which the defendant must be aware when pleading: "The reason for
the conclusion is that the right to parole has become so engrafted on
the criminal sentence that such right is assumed by the average defendant."'" These trends do not remedy the present inconsistencies
among the circuits. What is needed is a uniform standard that will
require defendants to be informed of the severest of consequences to
which their plea is likely to subject them.
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court ruled in Kercheval v. United
States7 2 that a defendant's plea was not valid unless made with "full
understanding of the consequences." In 1970, the Court stated that
the defendant's plea was valid if made "with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. '73 The Court has
not elaborated on its meaning of the term "consequences" and has
left the interpretation to the circuits. Permitting a circuit by circuit
interpretation, however, has not created a viable solution and the
need exists for a uniform practice which would relieve the anomaly
present in the current approach. In Cuthrell, the Fourth Circuit
missed an opportunity to propose an alternative procedure which
might have initiated a better and more equitable position.
JONATHAN ROGERS
-432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"rTrujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting Smith v.
United States, 324 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
,"United States v. Farias, 459 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 1972).
71475 F.2d at 1366. See also Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir.
1972).
72274 U.S. 220 (1927).
7'Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

